Philosophy of Time Society Forum

Dear Members,

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the Eastern APA, December 27-30, 2012, in Atlanta. Abstracts should be sent by email attachment to me by May 1. Email: jonathan.tallant@nottingham.ac.uk

Please also advise whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator. Volunteers willing to chair or comment but not planning to submit are also welcome.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Tallant
President of the Philosophy of Time Society

Just released:
 
The Future of the Philosophy of Time (Routledge, 2012), edited by Adrian Bardon

http://www.amazon.com/Future-Philosophy-Routledge-Studies-Metaphysics/dp/0415891108/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1320248763&sr=1-1

Featuring new essays by L. Nathan Oaklander, Michael Tooley, Ulrich Meyer, Jenann Ismael, Tim Maudlin, L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton, Heather Dyke, Yuval Dolev, and Craig Callender.

In 1916 Einstein published an argument to show that the relativity of simultaneity [RS] could be deduced without knowing more about special relativity [STR] than the constancy and invariance of the velocity of light. (Relativity: The Special and the General Theory. 1st English tr. 1920, pp. 27-29.) I believe the argument can be improved.

The idea is that a moving train is hit by lightning at both ends. An observer on an embankment is at the mid-point of the train at the instant of the simultaneous lightning strikes. Hence this observer sees the flashes of lightning simultaneously. A passenger in the train is sitting at its mid-point. Because the train is moving forward, the passenger sees the front strike before the rear strike, but this is in the frame of the embankment. Einstein claimed that for the same reason, the passenger in the train would also see the front flash first, thus illustrating the relativity of simultaneity. The logic of this seems unclear. Without a transformation formula, we have no way of knowing what the time coordinates in the moving frame are.

One can argue like this: Either the times of seeing the two strikes are the same in the passenger’s frame or they are not. If the strikes appear simultaneous, this is RS for the events of seeing the flashes. If the strikes appear non-simultaneous, the strikes happen at different times in the passenger’s frame, because the flashes travel equal distances to the observer and at the same speed. This is RS for the events of the two strikes.

String theorist Lubos Motl makes claims about time in "Ten new things modern physics has learned about time". (1) is "Time is just another, imaginary dimension of space" and (2) is ""eternalism vs presentism" debates: they're just battles about what terminology should be used." I think most philosophers of time would take these as wrong. Perhaps we need more philosophy/physics communication.

Ref: http://motls.blogspot.com/2011/09/ten-new-things-modern-physics-has.html

At risk of shameless self-promotion, here's a video I recorded with Brady Haran at the University of Nottingham. It's an 'intro to phil time' piece.

Lee Smolin of the Perimeter Institute has a great seminar on time at

http://streamer.perimeterinstitute.ca/Flash/9218e873-97d5-42ba-b1c7-70e498081c43/viewer.html

His basic idea is that we cannot neglect the successions of NOWs if we try to study the universe as a whole.

http://streamer.perimeterinstitute.ca/Flash/9218e873-97d5-42ba-b1c7-70e498081c43/viewer.html

I've written a number of articles on the nature of time and the nature of mind. I invite PTS members to read my articles:

http://time-mind.net/intro.html

Time Travel Without Paradox

Part I

Time, "Happenings," and Quantum Reality:

A subjective event is an event that exists inside the mind. An objective event is an event that exists outside the mind (i.e., an event that exists independently of the mind).

The word "happen" implies a passage of time. In order for an event to "happen," time has to pass.

Let us suppose that E1 is an objective event. In order for E1 to "happen," an objectively flowing time must exist.

If an objectively flowing time does not exist, nothing can "happen" objectively (i.e., nothing can "happen" outside the mind).

***

What is the nature of quantum reality (i.e., "QR")? Does anything "happen" in this reality?

In QR:

- Subjective events (e.g., conscious observations) "happen."(1)
- Objective events (i.e., superspace events) do not "happen."(2)(3)

Notes for Part I:

1. Subjective events "happen" in quantum reality (QR) because consciousness flows.

2. Objective events do not "happen" in QR because superspace is static.

3. The physical quantum world is an abstract world of possibilities (potentialities). Nothing actually "happens" in this world. (See: Nick Herbert, *Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1985), 27.)

***

Part II

Time Travel:

Let us suppose that Ann is a time traveler who lives in the universe "U1." In order for a paradox to arise when Ann travels backward in time, statements S1 and S2 below must both be true. Note however: These statements are both false. Since S1 and S2 are false, we must conclude the following: When Ann travels backward in time, a paradox does not arise.(1)

Statement S1: "Objective events 'happen' in U1."(2)
Statement S2: "An objective event exists in U1 that both 'happens' and does not 'happen'."(3)(4)

***

A "subjective happening" is a "subjective experience that happens inside an individual mind." An "objective happening" is an "objective event that happens outside the mind." Ann's experience of traveling backward in time is a "subjective happening" (not an "objective happening").

***

Grandfather Paradox:

The events that create the grandfather paradox (i.e., "GP") are objective, physical events that "happen" outside the mind. In U1, objective, physical events do not "happen." Therefore, in that universe, the events that create GP do not "happen."

***

If the events that create GP do not "happen," GP does not arise. In U1, the events that create GP do not "happen." Therefore, in that universe, GP does not arise.(5)

Notes for Part II:

1. S1 and S2 are always false. Since these statements are always false, we conclude the following: In U1, backward time travel never gives rise to paradox.

2. If an objectively flowing time does not exist, objective events do not "happen." In U1, an objectively flowing time does not exist. Therefore, in that universe, objective events do not "happen."

3. Statement S2 presumes that objective events "happen" in the universe U1. Note however: Objective events do not "happen" in U1. Statement S2 is therefore false.

4. In order for statement S2 to be true, S1 must be true. Since S1 is not true, S2 is not true.

5. We must not confuse the "grandfather paradox" (i.e., "GP") with the "*concept* of the grandfather paradox" (i.e., "CGP"). GP is a scenario that arises outside the mind. CGP is a thought that resides within the mind.

***

http://time-mind.net/intro.html

http://time-mind.net/set_model.html

http://deoxy.org/superspace.htm

Target Article 61

http://www.kjf.ca/61-TAAND.htm

http://www.KJF.ca

Adhanom Andemicael
andemicaela@yahoo.com

Professor Nathan Oaklander has recently given a lecture on Cosmological and Conscious Time. This can be viewed, here:

Dear Members of the Philosophy of Time Society,

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, which will take place at the Westin Seattle from April 4-8, 2012, Seattle WA. Abstracts should be sent by email attachment to me (in capacity as Vice President of the PTS), by September 30. My email address is: jonathan.tallant@nottingham.ac.uk

Please also state if you wish whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator.

If you know of colleagues who might be interested in this announcement, please feel free to forward this email.

It's possible to make sense of "1 second per second".

This just means a clock-hand shows a difference of 1 second, through '1 second' of qualitative/absolute temporal flow. They are two different things. Thus, it makes sense to say, of a second clock, that it evolves at 1/2 second per second, if its relatively moving or in a gravitational gradient. It is *also* possible to say the second clock evolves at 1/2 second per second and mean you're only comparing the moving clock's hand positions with a local stationary clock's hand positions. That's all relativity does.

But in the previous sense, of things evolving in qualitative/absolute temporal flow, the local stationary clock evolves at a rate of 1 second per qualitative second, or q-second. The moving clock, similarly, evolves at a rate of 1 second per *its* q-second. Its q-seconds are not ontologically comparable to the local stationary q-seconds. The qualitative/absolute time is ontologically ineffable, as argued for previously. The ontologically "effable" part of time is given by the relativistic correlations. There is no fact of the matter, or ontologically possible comparison, between different q-seconds.

I would like to start a collaboration to investigate the idea that part of time is ontologically ineffable (incommunicable). For example, suppose I communicate to you a mathematical theory of time, e.g. time is like the real line. You can always counter: that's not a full theory of time, because math objects are timeless/static: you can always imagine a point moving along the real line that selects "the moment" that really exists. But a mathematical model can never account for this behavior, no matter how smart we are. So I'm thinking this may be an ontological phenomenon and not merely epistemological.

If so, this seems to lead to a new interpretation of quantum mechanics: to the extent objects are ontologically distinct, they evolve independently on distinct timelines. In a universe where all information is embodied information, this would lead to (relative) superpositions, since there is no "single time" when everything has a classical state.

I've started some ideas at http://reflectionssonntimee.blogspot.com/

CFP

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division, which will take place at the Marriott Wardman Park, in Washington, DC, from December 27-30, 2011.  Abstracts should be sent by email attachment to the Vice President of the Society, Jonathan Tallant, by the 1st of May. jonathan.tallant@nottingham.ac.uk

Please also state if you wish whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator.

If you know of colleagues who might be interested in this announcement, please feel free to forward this message.

Although the mathematics of relativity is correct, I am provoked by the interpretation that it rules out 'time flow' and that present events are specified by simultaneity (a spacelike hypersurface will do). My paper "A theistic model of physical temporality" - giving both time flow and a relativistic present - has appeared in Analecta Husserliana, 2011, Vol. 107, Part 5, 289-295 (published November 2010). There are links to the final version (on SpringerLink) and to a freely available much longer form presented at the conference on Astronomy and Civilisation, Budapest, August 2009, at http://homepage.ntlworld.com/stone-catend/time.htm .

I'm happy to announce a new book in the philosophy of time. 'Presentism: Essential Readings', edited by Ernâni Magalhães and L. Nathan Oaklander, is now available through Lexington Books. For more details please check the publisher's website.

http://www.lexingtonbooks.com/Catalog/SingleBook.shtml?command=Search&db=%5EDB/CATALOG.db&eqSKUdata=0739145002

2009-10 Chronos

Dear All,

The 2009-10 copy of Chronos has now been emailed out. If you have not received it, but think that you should have, please drop me a line: jonathan.tallant@nottingham.ac.uk

Call for papers

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to the philosophy of time for its group meeting at the Central Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association meetings March 30-April 2, 2011, Hilton Minneapolis Hotel, Minneapolis, MN.   Abstracts should be sent by email attachment to the President of the Society, Professor L. Nathan Oaklander, at  lno@umflint.edu  by August 15.   Please also advise whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator; volunteers willing to chair or comment but not planning to submit are also welcome.

 

In addition, we extend an invitation once again for submissions of abstracts for the Eastern Division PTS group meeting December 27-30, 2010, Boston, MA - Marriott/Westin-Copley Connection.  The deadline for submissions for this meeting is May 1, and again submitted to the President by attachment to lno@umflint.edu .

 

If you know colleagues who might be interested in this announcement, please feel free to forward this email.

Philosophy of time seminar

Follow this link to see photos from our seminar this weekend:

 

http://picasaweb.google.com/106587092335138408256/TimeSeminar?feat=directlink

Chronos

Dear Members,

I've emailed out the 2008/09 copy of Chronos, today, using our must up-do-date list of email addresses. If you have not received a copy, and think that you should have, please drop me a line: jonathan.tallant@nottingham.ac.uk.

Best wishes,

Jonathan

Minkowski Spatiotemporal Distance

I think I get some things in the special theory of relativity (STR) and in the Minkowski representation thereof. I think I get that there is no two-term earlier-than relation: 'X is earlier than Y' is just not well-formed in the theory. It only makes sense to suppose X is earlier than Y in frame of reference F. Now, the Minkowski representation of STR replaces spatial and temporal relations with a more basic spacetime relation. My question: suppose we take two 'events', E1 and E2, in the Minkowski representation, each occupying just one point. (These are not extended events or wordlines, but instantaneous elements.) Is the question what is the spacetime distance between E1 and E2 well formed? Is there a basic spacetime distance relation that is either frame invariant or frame independent in the Minkowski representation?

---Ernani

Physics constructed from a temporal successor relation

The philosophy of time is apt to be affected by the analytic treatment of time in the formal developments of physics.  I've come to some remarkable encouragement in my attempt to formulate physics entirely in terms of time sequence alone.  My background is in philosophy of science with Grover Maxwell, many years ago.  We shared an understanding of Russell's solution to the mind-body problem.  In 2002-03, I wrote a "belated thesis" for Grover, who is deceased.  It is basically a study of Russell and Whitehead's eventism, titled "The Mind-Body Problem and Its Solution."  In the course of writing, I used simple arrow diagrams to depict what Russell calls "causal structure" and Whitehead calls "temporal succession."  I noticed that what may be called "relative frequency ratios" are formed in such time diagrams.  These may serve physics as relative energy ratios in accord with Planck's E=hf.  This constitutes a structural definition of mass-energy in terms of time sequence alone.  Encouraged by this, I proceeded with more arrow diagram constructions, arriving at a simple 4-D time lattice to replace "space-time."  That in turn led me to the structure of neutrinos and electrons, and the definition of charge quanta.  I extracted the formal material for a separate booklet titled "A Theory of Everything for Physics."  I've been calling the theory "finite eventism."  I have an article with that title, in a book edited by David Skrbina, which was just published.

Please search the phrase "finite eventism" for links to my posted writings on the theory, and to the Amazon web pages for my two self-published books.

-- Carey R. Carlson (guest member)

Call for Abstracts -- Eastern APA 2009

Dear Members,

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the Eastern APA, December 27-30, 2009, in New York City. Abstracts should be sent by email attachment to me by May 1. Please also advise whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator. Volunteers willing to chair or comment but not planning to submit are also welcome.

Sincerely,

Ernani Magalhaes
Secretary, Philosophy of Time Society

Announcement

Dear all,

My paper "Temporal Passage" was posted in the Karl Jaspers Forum (KJF) on
the 8th of July, 2003 as "Target Article 61." The forum's website address
is:

http://www.KJF.ca
http://www.kjf.ca/61-TAAND.htm

The paper can also be accessed at my website:

http://home.att.net/~Andemicael/intro.html

Please read the article. And if you have any comments, please feel free to
post them at the KJF site.

Best regards,

Adhanom Andemicael
Andemicael@att.net

Call for papers: Pacific APA

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high-quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the 2009 Pacific APA, April 8-12, in Vancouver. Abstracts should be sent to L. Nathan Oaklander at lno@umflint.edu by September 30. Please also advise whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator.

Merleau-Ponty conference announcement

Ryerson University is hosting the upcoming 33rd annual conference of the International Merleau-Ponty Circle:

"Time, Memory, and the Self: Remembering Merleau-Ponty at 100"

Ryerson University, September 18-20

See the conference website for details.

New Anthology: The Philosophy of Time

Routledge has just released a four-volume anthology on the philosophy of time, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander. See attached PDF for information. Download philosophy_time_std.pdf 

Call for papers: Central APA

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high-quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the Central APA, February 18-21, in Chicago. Abstracts should be sent to L. Nathan Oaklander at lno@umflint.edu by August 15. Please also advise whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator.

Your contact information needed!

We have a number of new and renewed members for whom we have neither a valid email address nor snail mail address. If you are a member and have not received any communications from us recently, or have recently changed your email address and/or mailing address, please send your new contact info to our Treasurer, Trevor Jennings at tej_talbot@hotmail.com.

McTaggart and Presentism

I've been doing some research on McTaggart's Paradox and its relation to presentism.  Bill Craig thinks that the best response to McTaggart's Paradox is to endorse presentism.

Question 1: Which articles do people take to be the most clear, penetrating, and helpful discussions of McTaggart's Paradox?  I'd like to understand it better.

Question 2: I've read most of Craig's stuff on the topic relating McTaggart's Paradox to presentism.  Is anybody aware of other authors who have written on their relation?  Which articles would you recommend?

Time on Trial Conference Pictures

The conference on McTaggart's argument, "Time on Trial," was a big success I think. Pictures of the event are available at www.wvu.edu/~philosophy/timeontrial.html. We'll have video of the conference up there shortly. I'll have an update on the publication of the proceedings as soon as I have definite details.

Ernani Magalhaes

Call for Papers: Eastern Division APA

We are issuing a call for abstracts for the Eastern Division Meeting of
the Philosophy of Time Society on December 27-30, 2008, Philadelphia,
PA- Marriott Hotel. The deadline for submission is May 15, 2008 and
notification will occur on or before May 31, 2008. Please send your
abstract to Nathan Oaklander at lno@umflint.edu

Goedel told me so

    Since time is a physical quantity which can measured with fantastic accuracy, I've always taken it for granted.   By chance I ran across the PTS and it has introduced me to the many paradoxes inherent in time.  I have just read a book by Palle Yourgrau entitled "A World Without TIme: The Forgotten Legacy of Goedel and Einstein."  Kurt Goedel was perhaps  the greatest logician of the 20th century, if not of all time.  Goedel and Einstein became close friends in 1942 at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies.  Einstein taught Goedel general relativity.  Goedel developed a cosmology based on a rotating universe which was consistent with general relativity.  According to Yourgrau this consistency has never been dis-proven.  In Goedel's universe time was cyclical, hence it was possible to travel into the past.  Goedel concluded that the existence of time was inconsistent with general relativity.  To this day, this conclusion is either disbelieved or ignored.   Yourgrau states that "Rarely have so many understood so little about so much."  If one has the time(?), this book is well written and is a fun read for anyone interested in mathematical logic, physics, and the characters that once inhabited these domains.
    L J Swartzendruber

New bibliography

Check out the new on line bibliography for the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies at http://consc.net/mindpapers. There are two subsections listing lots of papers from philosophy and beyond on "temporal consciousness" and "time and consciousness."

This philosophy of mind site raises the question, perhaps we should put together our own group bibliography on time studies...

Truthmaker is a Goner

I've been reading Trenton Merricks' new book Truth and Ontology, and he spends the first few chapters beating up on Truthmaker.  I now think that Truthmaker is a goner.

"Truthmaker says that for every true claim there is something or other that - just by existing - makes that claim true" (p. 1).  If Truthmaker is true, then presentists who believe that propositions like D: that there were dinosaurs are true are in trouble because it seems that nothing presently exists to make (D) true.  Similar things could be said for propositions about brute dispositions, modal properties, subjunctive conditionals (including counterfactuals of freedom), and so on.  The principle motivation behind Truthmaker, Merricks points out, is to "catch the cheaters" - cheaters like presentists.

A big objection to Truthmaker is that negative existentials like H: that Hobbits don't exist don't need truthmakers but are true.  (H) is obviously true.  So Truthmaker is false.

Merricks devotes chapter 3 to dealing with ways that the Truthmaker theorist might try to account for the truths of negative existentials.  Perhaps the universe has the property of being such that there are no hobbits, and this property is the truthmaker for (H).  But then cheaters can make the same move.  They can say that the proposition (D) is made true by the universe's having the property of being such that there were dinosaurs.

Or perhaps (H) is made true by the totality of all existing objects in the universe.  But all this could exist and (H) could be false.  (It's possible that all existing objects in the universe exist and Hobbits exist as well.)

Perhaps (H) is made true by the totality of all existing objects in the universe and the universe's having the property being such that there is nothing else.  But then, as mentioned above, there doesn't seem to be a principled reason to disallow properties like being such that there were dinosaurs.

Merricks' response to that last objection is what did it for me.  Truthmaker theorists should move on to defending other principles like "truth supervenes on being" or they should formulate new principles.  But maybe my conclusion is to quick.  Is there any hope for Truthmaker?

Constituents of Times

Some people define a time as a maximally consistent set of propositions.  It seems to me that this is false because a set has its members essentially, but what is true at a time is only contingently true at that time.  (So that Bill walks to the store is the true at t, but it could have been false at t.)

But a bunch of smart people think of times as sets of propositions.  Consider:

Thomas Crisp:

"x is a time =df. For some class C of propositions such that C is maximal and consistent, x=[Ay(y is a member of C -> y is true]." ("Presentism and the Grounding Objection", Nous 41:1, 2007, p. 99)

(The "A" should stand for the universal quantifier.  In the article, Crisp cites Chisholm, Edward Zalta, Arthur Prior, Kit Fine, and Matthew Davidson as holding similar views.  Crisp's view strikes me as bizarre, since the only time that exists is the present time since that's the only one that's true.  But I bet I'm missing something really obvious.)

Ned Markosian

"There is the abstract present time, which is a maximal, consistent proposition.  There are many things that are similar to the abstract present time in being maximal, consistent propositions that either will be true, are true, or have been true.  Each one is a time.  The abstract present time is the only one of all of these abstract times that happens to be true now." ("A Defense of Presentism", Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1, 2003, p. 76)

Robin Le Poidevin

"An instant, that is, is equated with all the propositions which would ordinarily be described as being (contingently) true at that instant.  The content of the propositions concerns the states of affairs taking place at that instant..." (Change, Cause, and Contradiction, 1991, p. 37)

(Here, Le Poidevin is referring to Prior's views, though he thinks that all presentists are committed to this definition.)

Craig Bourne

"I propose we construct times using maximally consistent sets of u-propositions, which intuitively we can see as those u-propositions that are true at that time." (A Future for Presentism, 2006, p. 53-54)

(By "u-proposition", Bourne is referring to a proposition without a past or future tense operator on it.)

The point that what is true at a time is contingent was pointed out by W.L. Craig in his critique of Le Poidevin's critique of presentism (A Tensed Theory of Time, p. 213), and Craig cites van Inwagen as noting this in his article "Indexicality and Actuality", 1980, footnote 3).

I think that Craig and Van Inwagen are right.  But doesn't this then make Crisp, Markosian, and Bourne's view of times implausible?

Are presentism/eternalism, etc. metaphysical or empirical claims?

Some claim that presentism is falsified by special relativity. Does that make presentism a contingent truth? If the speed of light were infinite, would that change matters for presentism? Do eternalism or the growing block theory, if true, have the status of metaphysical truth?

Eastern APA Meeting Papers

The paper Adrian Bardon will be presenting at the Eastern APA PTS meeting, "Kant and the Conventionality of Simultaneity," is available at the following link: bardon_simultaneity.doc

McTaggart Conference

April 25 and 26, 2008 West Virginia University will host "Time on Trial: One Hundred Years of McTaggart's Argument Against Time," a conference commemorating the anniversay of McTaggart's "The Unreality of Time." I'm pleased to announce we will have three outstanding keynote speakers: Nathan Oaklander, Quentin Smith, and Michael Tooley.

Quality submissions - 3,000 words - are also sought. They should be sent in blind review format to the email address below by November 1. The proceedings will be published in Philosophia.

Ernani Magalhaes (ernani.magalhaes@mail.wvu.edu)

McTaggart Anniversary

So next year is the 100th anniversary of the publication of "The Unreality of Time", which first introduced the notions of "A-series" and "B-series" to the philosophical literature. Is there anything being done to celebrate this? It seems like there should be some sort of conference on McTaggart's argument, considering it is arguably the most influential article in our field.

We Need a Chair and a Commentator for the Eastern APA

We need a chair for the group PTS meeting at the Eastern APA. We also need a commentator for Yuri Balashov's paper on coexistence. Please! Email me: ernani.magalhaes@mail.wvu.edu

Presentism and Special Relativity

I was once a presentist, but I have become convinced that special relativity makes presentism untenable. I would be interested in hearing what others have to say on this subject.